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The Ospedale degli Innocenti in the Piazza della Santissima Annunziatia 
in Florence, which dates back to the 15th century, was a place of refuge for 
babies whose mothers could not cope with taking care of them. Brunelleschi, 
the Italian architect and engineer, was responsible for the design of the 
beautiful colonnaded building.  Its façade is adorned with blue and white 
glazed terra cotta bas-reliefs, sculpted by Andrea Della Robbia. These depict 
chubby Florentine babies, naked or wrapped in swaddling clothes, and are a 
symbol of the building’s function. Any mother who wished to surrender her 
baby into the care of the Ospedale could place it in a stoup below a small 
window in a wall of the building. The stoup opened onto an inner room where 
a woman waited and removed each baby immediately after it was placed 
there. In the 18th century the stoup was replaced by a wheel, rather like a “lazy 
Susan”. The baby was placed on the wheel, which was turned, and the baby 
was delivered into the arms of the woman waiting inside the orphanage. 
Babies were sent out to wet nurses until they were weaned and then returned 
to the orphanage where they remained until they were fostered out or became 
old enough to work or, in the case of girls, betrothed to marry. All the children 
acquired the same family name - Innocenti. 
The most important fact about the refuge was that the mother was allowed 
to remain completely anonymous; no effort was made to find out her identity. 
The mother was able to depart knowing that her baby was in safe hands and 
that no one need know that she had given birth. But of course in 15th century 
Florence there was no law which permitted a challenge to her right to 
anonymity and allowed the authorities to hand over the baby into the care of a 
member of her extended family against the mothers’ will.  
Life in 21st century England for an unmarried mother, who wishes to 
surrender her child for adoption, is remarkably different from that of 15th 
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century Florence. There is both domestic law in the form of the Adoption and 
Children Act 2002 (“Adoption Act”), and the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) (ECHR) 
which may lead to an interference with a mother’s desire for anonymity. She 
risks the intervention of the local authority, and its social workers, to whom 
she has entrusted her child to be placed for adoption. In the interests of the 
child’s welfare, under s1 of the Adoption Act, and right to family life under 
Art 8 of the Convention, they may attempt to destroy the mother’s right to 
private life, under Art 8 of the Convention, and ensure that her family and the 
child’s father and his family, who may also have rights to family life under 
Art 8, are made aware of the situation and be asked to care for the child.  
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Re C (a child) (adoption: duty of 
local authority)59 addressed these issues both in terms of the Adoption Act 
and the Convention. 
 
THE FACTS IN RE C 
 
The appellant mother, in Re C, was nineteen years old and unmarried. She 
had become pregnant as a result of a one off sexual encounter with the child’s 
father and had given birth to a baby daughter who was four months old at the 
time of the Appeal Court hearing. The mother was unaware of her pregnancy 
for a considerable period of time. She had not confided in the father, or her 
family, about her pregnancy or the baby’s birth. Indeed, she had only sought 
medical help when she went into labour. Immediately after the birth, the 
mother made a request to the local authority to place her baby daughter for 
adoption and left hospital without her. The mother made clear to the local 
authority, within whose jurisdiction the case fell, that she was not prepared to 
identify the baby’s father, and that she did not think anyone in her extended 
family could care for the baby. She explained to the social worker that her 
parents were divorced. She had left home at the age of seventeen after a 
serious dispute with her mother, and no longer was in contact with her.. Her 
father was retired, and she rarely saw him. He had remarried; his new wife 
had three teenage children of her own. The local authority's response to this 
information was to make an application for a care order under the Children 
Act 1989.  
 
THE JUDGE’S DECISION 
 
The judge acknowledged that the application should have been made 
under the Adoption Act and that s 1(2) of the Act, like s 1 of the Children Act 
1989, provides that in reaching any decision relating to the adoption of a child   
59  [2007] 3 FCR 659, EWCA Civ 1206. 
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“The paramount consideration of the court or adoption agency must be 
the child's welfare, throughout his life...” 
 
The judge held that s 1 of the Adoption Act left the local authority with no 
choice but to inform themselves about the background of the mother's family 
in order to decide the baby’s future. He maintained that it would be in the best 
interests of the baby: 
 
“…to be placed within the family… the reality is -- as we all know 
nowadays -- that when children are adopted they come to a time in 
their lives when they do enquire about their parentage and it would be 
cruel in the extreme to prevent this child having as much knowledge 
as possible about her background in the event that she is adopted, even 
if that information comes without the consent of the mother but as a 
result of the authorities informing themselves of the relevant 
information.”60
 
The judge expressed the hope that the mother would change her mind and 
agree to help the local authority to work with her family. He made an order 
which gave the mother twenty-one days to consider whether she might 
cooperate, but if she failed to do so, the local authority would be free to 
contact her family. There was a misunderstanding about the nature of the 
order, and the children’s social care section of the local authority contacted 
the mother's parents by letter. It asked to meet with them but failed to explain 
the purpose of such a meeting. The parents subsequently learned of the baby’s 
birth and offered to help the local authority resolve the situation.  
The mother appealed the order. 
 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE APPEAL COURT (ARDEN, COLLINS, 
THORPE LJJ) 
 
There were two issues arising on the appeal. First, whether s 1 of the 
Adoption Act imposed an absolute duty on the local authority, prior to the 
baby’s adoption, to contact any of her biological relatives to ascertain whether 
she could be cared for by them. Second, how the court’s discretion to give 
directions about contacting relatives should be exercised.  
Arden LJ gave the leading judgment, with which Collins and Thorpe LJJ 
concurred, and the mother’s appeal was allowed. 
 
60 Ibid, at para 11. 
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Judicial Discretion Prior to the Adoption Act 
Prior to the Adoption Act 2002, Arden LJ explained, the courts had 
discretion to decide whether to take into account the views of an unmarried 
father, who had not acquired parental responsibility, of a newborn baby before 
she was placed for adoption. In general, there was a judicial assumption that 
the father should be informed of his child’s birth unless there were very good 
reasons not to do so. Art 8 of the Convention confirmed that approach (see 
Rozanski v Poland).61  However, Art 8 presupposes the existence of a family 
(see Marckx v Belgium;62 Johnson v United Kingdom).63 Thus, a father will 
sacrifice his right if his relationship with the mother was fleeting and/or there 
was little semblance of a family to which he belonged (see Nylund v 
Finland).64 Similarly, he will not be contacted if the relationship with the 
mother was abusive. The decisions in Re H, Re G (Adoption: Consultation of 
Unmarried Fathers)65 illustrates the courts’ approach to the rights of fathers 
under Art 8. In Re G, the mother had never lived with the father of her child. 
Their relationship had not been sufficiently committed for the court to find 
that they were a family prior to the child’s birth. Consequently, the father had 
no right to be informed of the adoption proceedings.  By contrast, in Re H, the 
mother had cohabited for a time with the father of the child and had 
previously given birth to another child by him, and to whom the father 
showed a continuing commitment. The father was held to have a right to 
family life and should therefore be consulted about the adoption (see also 
JRM v Netherlands).66 Contact with the father, of course, presupposes that his 
identity is known. If the mother refuses to identify him, there is little that a 
court can do to enforce contact. In re L (2007),67 Munby J stated that apart 
from repeating the request to the mother to identify the father no further steps 
could be taken. 
 
The Statutory Framework of the Adoption Act 
 
Arden LJ maintained that the judicial discretion relating to the 
involvement of unmarried fathers, without parental responsibility, in the 
adoption proceedings had been changed by s1 of the Adoption Act. That 
section now provides a statutory framework, albeit with a discretionary 
element, for the determination of any decisions relating to the adoption of a 
61 (2005) App 55339/00. 
62 (1979) 2 EHRR 330. 
63 (1999) 27 EHRR 296. 
64 Application No 27110/95. 
65 (2001) 1 FLR 646. 
66 Application No 16944/90. 
67 EWHC 1771.  
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child including questions of contact with the child’s family of origin, prior to 
placement for adoption. The overarching paramountcy principle which is laid 
down in s 1(2) of the Act is child centred rather than mother centred. 
Adoption is seen more as a means of  ‘giving a child a family and not the 
child to a family’ (see Frette v France).68  S 1(3) specifically emphasizes the 
fact that delays in decision making are not generally beneficial for the welfare 
of children, and the courts and the local authority must bear that in mind. S 
1(4) provides a non-exclusive, non-hierarchical check list of the matters to 
which the local authority and the court must have regard in making a decision 
relating to the future adoption of the child. They are: 
 
• any likely effect on the child of ceasing to be a member of his or her 
original family (s1(4)(c)); 
• the relationship which the child has with relatives or any other person 
who is viewed as relevant (s1(4)(f)); 
• the likelihood of that relationship continuing and the value of it to the 
child (s1(4)(f)(i); 
• the ability and willingness of any relative or other person to provide 
the child with a secure environment in which the child’s needs and 
development can be nurtured (s1(4)(f)(ii); 
• the wishes and feelings of the child’s relatives or of any other such 
person regarding the child (s1(4)(f)(iii). 
 
The Duty to Consult and the Welfare Principle 
 
The meaning of relatives in s 1(4)(f) of the Act, is not limited to legal 
relations (s 1(8)) nor, according to Arden LJ, was it limited to those with 
whom the child has had a relationship but might also include, in accordance 
with Art 8 of the Convention, potential relationships which the child might 
develop in the future (see Pini v Romania).69 However, she circumscribed the 
effect of the section and explained that the combination of s 1(2) and s 1(4)(f) 
means that: 
 
“… when a decision requires to be made about the long-term care of a 
child, whom a mother wishes to be adopted, there is no duty to make 
enquiries [of the family] which it is not in the interests of the child to 
make, and enquiries are not in the interests of the child simply because 
they will provide more information about the child's background: they 
must genuinely further the prospect of finding a long-term carer for 
the child without delay. This interpretation does not violate the right to 
68 (2004) 38 EHRR 21. 
69 (2005) EHRR 1. 
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family life. The objective of finding long-term care must be the focus 
of making any further enquiries and that means the court has to 
evaluate evidence about those prospects. That did not happen in this 
case.”70
 
Arden LJ found that the judge in the court below had merely considered:  
 
“…that in adult life the child would benefit from more information 
about the child’s father. But in the context of the decision-making 
with which the judge was concerned, I do not consider that that fact 
could of itself animate indeed the exercise of discretion. The 
immediate question with which the Guardian and local authority were 
concerned was who would look after the child on a long-term basis. 
The enquiries had to be focused on that result. That meant looking at 
the evidence about the prospective carers within the mother’s 
family… finding out about the child’s background for her information 
in the future was secondary to that objective, and it would inevitably 
lead to delay.”71
 
The father, in Re C, in accordance with the authorities above, had 
forfeited his right to any relationship with her.  
Arden LJ accepted that the mother’s clear, and negative, views about the 
suitability of anyone within her daughter’s family of origin as a potential 
carer, was not a conclusive reason not to permit contact with the family, but it 
should certainly have been taken into consideration. 
Throughout her judgment, Arden LJ stressed that in any decision relating 
to the question of contacting a new born baby’s extended family, the welfare 
principle demanded that a permanent home be found for her, without delay, 
with parents who could commit to care for her throughout her life and with 
whom she could form a lasting relationship. The bond with her foster parents 
had already begun to develop and it would be very hard for her to cope with 
the move to new adoptive parents if a decision about her future was not made 
with the utmost urgency.  
In granting the mother’s appeal, the Court of Appeal made an order to the 
effect that the local authority: 
 
• must not identify the father or inform him of the birth of the baby; 
• must not introduce the baby to her grandparents or assess them as 
potential carers for her; 
70 Ibid,  nb 1,  para 3. 
71 Ibid,  nb 1, para 21. 
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• must meet with the maternal grandparents to discuss the letter which 
it had sent to them and  explain to them the outcome of the appeal. 
  
The Benefits of Anonymity 
 
Thorpe LJ, with a certain amount of empathy, drew attention to the 
dilemma faced by mothers who wish for anonymity vis-a-vis the father of 
their child and/or their extended families when relinquishing a baby for 
adoption.  He accepted that there were valid social policy considerations for 
permitting the mother to treat the experience of pregnancy and birth as a 
matter for her alone and not one to be shared with the baby’s extended family 
(see eg Odièrvre v France).72 Thorpe LJ pointed out that in France it had been 
long acknowledged that anonymity for mothers reduced the risk of abortion, 
infanticide or abandonment, as well as possible damage to the mother or her 
child as a result of giving birth secretly.  
A further risk was referred to by Thorpe LJ; if the Court of Appeal was to 
refuse the mother’s appeal and hold that the local authority was under an 
absolute duty to contact the child’s extended family, it could affect fast track 
adoption. Fast track adoption under s19 of the Adoption Act, together with the 
emphasis in s 1(3) of the Act on the prejudicial effect of delay on the child in 
placing her with an adoptive family, was considered to be a corner stone of 
the legislation by Parliament. Babies need stable families and they need them 
as rapidly as possible after birth if they are to bond with their adoptive 
parents, and grow up into psychologically well-adjusted adults. 
 
The Adoptive Child’s Rights to Knowledge of her Birth Family 
 
Under English law, an adoptive child has minimal rights to knowledge of 
her family of origin. At the age of eighteen, she may consult the Adopted 
Children Register and acquire a copy of her birth certificate. Armed with this 
information, she may then consult the Adopted Contact Register, which lists 
birth parents and relatives of adopted children who wish to be contacted by an 
adopted person. The latter may also list her own details on the register.  
The judge in Re C, appeared to be taking it into his own hands to attempt 
to ensure that more information about the child’s family of origin would be 
available to her at a later date even if none of its members were able to care 
for her. It may be that the child’s own Art 8 rights could be called into play to 
support such an approach. It would however conflict with the mother’s right 
to a private life.  
 
72 (2003) 1 FCR 621. 
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Fathers’ Rights 
 
Many fathers of adopted children maintain that their Art 8 rights to family 
life are far too strictly limited by the need to demonstrate the existence of a 
family and some level of permanency in their relationships with a child’s 
mother, prior to the child’s birth. They may well be prepared and able to take 
care of a child but will not be given the opportunity to do so even if the 
mother is prepared to reveal the father’s identity. It may be that a mother’s 
right to anonymity requires to be balanced more equally with the father’s right 
to contact with his child (See Families Need Fathers www.fnf.org.uk/). 
 
BABY SAFE HAVENS 
 
Thorpe LJ, in Re C, pointed out that there is not only one solution to the 
tension between the rights of the mother and the rights of the child. In the US, 
a very different solution has been found to help mothers who feel unable to 
care for their new born children and who do not wish their families to be 
involved. Forty-six States have now enacted legislation permitting the 
anonymous, but responsible, handing over of unwanted babies. Massachusetts 
is one of them.   The 21st century fire-houses, hospital emergency rooms and 
police stations of Massachusetts are a far cry, particularly architecturally, 
from the Ospedale degli Innocenti, yet they too have been charged with the 
reception of abandoned babies under the Massachusetts Baby Safe Haven 
Law which was enacted with a three year sunset clause in October 2004. In 
August 2007, the Governor of Massachusetts, Deval Patrick, made the 
legislation permanent. The Law was a sympathetic, emotional response to the 
predicament of an abandoned baby, known as Baby Vinnie, who was found 
wrapped in a blanket in a churchyard on Martha’s Vineyard by a woman out 
walking. The baby was suffering from hypothermia; he had been lying in the 
direct line of a sprinkler system throughout the night and was thoroughly 
soaked through. He survived after hospital treatment and was adopted.  
The Massachusetts Law legalizes the abandonment of babies up to seven 
days old, as long as they have not been abused, and have been handed over to 
an official at any of the designated locations. The mother’s total anonymity is 
permitted, although those handing over babies are encouraged, but may not be 
coerced, to give any information which might help to ensure the satisfactory 
future care of the child. Any child surrendered in this manner is immediately 
place in the custody of the Department of Social Services and, after a medical 
screening, is placed for adoption. The Law also provides for a Baby Safe 
Haven Hotline which operates twenty-four hours a day and gives information 
to pregnant mothers about pregnancy help and the post-birth options open to 
them.   
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
219 
The Law is not without its vociferous critics. The liberal pro-choice lobby 
maintains that it is a creation of the American anti-abortion lobby and merely 
an indirect means of strengthening its position. After all, if a parent can 
legitimately abandon a baby at birth, the case against abortion becomes even 
stronger.  Others argue that it is unfair to the baby who, if the mother decides 
not to hand over any personal information, will lack knowledge of its 
biological parents and genetic background which might be essential for 
medical reasons at some future date. The Law also appears to conflict with the 
growing demands of those involved in child welfare that all children, whether 
adopted, or conceived by way of reproductive technology involving donor 
eggs or sperm, have a right to information about their biological origin. 
Psychologists have voiced concern that the seven-day time limit places 
enormous and unfair pressure on a mother, who has just given birth, to make a 
momentous decision about the future of her child when she is in an 
emotionally fragile condition. Unmarried fathers fear that mothers may use 
the Law to prevent any possibility of their involvement with their biological 
children. The more serious sceptics believe that the type of parent for whom 
the legislation was enacted is unlikely to be sufficiently organized or 
confident enough to take her baby to a designated place of safety. It is all too 
easy to be dismissive of the benefits of the legislation; few babies have been 
surrendered to the authorities in Massachusetts since late 2004 compared with 
the vast numbers received at the Ospedale degli Innocenti over a similar 
period of time. However, it is possible that the publicity surrounding the 
legislation has drawn attention to the problems experienced by those who find 
themselves unhappily pregnant. It may help mothers, who might have been 
tempted to abandon their babies, to find an alternative route. The legislation 
may be imperfect but it may help to safeguard the welfare of unwanted babies 
and is certainly preferable to abandonment.  
